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Abstract
Fertility declines have been taking place across Canada in a number of different provincial 
family policy contexts since the 1960’s.  Although previous studies have assessed the impact of 
direct cost-reducing family policies in Canada, there is no body of work measuring the impact of 
indirect cost-reducing family policies across the county.  The objective of this paper is to 
determine whether provincial variations in indirect cost-reducing family policy impact fertility. 
This paper uses provincial unpaid job-protected parental leave lengths as a proxy for indirect 
cost-reducing family policy contexts.  Comparing multivariate and bivariate statistical analyses, I 
assess the impact of these policies on TFR by province and year from 1976 to 2006, controlling 
for male income, unemployment, female earnings, female labour force participation, and relative 
cohort size.  It is determined that a positive correlation exists between fertility and unpaid job-
protected leave, but whether this is a causal relationship is indeterminate.  
Keywords: fertility, family policy, parental leave, Canada
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. FERTILITY TRENDS SINCE THE 1960’S
Since the 1960’s, there have been dramatic decreases in fertility rates across the developed 
world.  This drop in fertility rates has affected population ageing and workforce composition, 
which in turn has created a new potential for economic woes in the coming decades.  In most 
developed countries, the coupling of increases in life expectancy with declines in fertility has 
meant that the dependency ratio – the ratio of children and elderly, or dependents, to working age 
members – has increased significantly over time.  For welfare states that have public pension 
schemes and burgeoning health care costs, this change in the population structure has been 
worrisome.  It implies that fewer and fewer people will be shouldering increasingly high costs.  
In the 1990’s, one of the key indices of fertility, the total fertility rate (TFR) hit lows that had yet 
to be seen in formerly high fertility countries.  The TFR, which is the most widely used index of 
fertility, is an important predictor of future population growth.  It measures the total number of 
children that a woman will have in her lifetime given that she survives until her fiftieth birthday 
(Hinde, 2007, pp.100). 1  A TFR of 2.1 is considered replacement level fertility, whereby a 
population exactly replaces itself from one generation to the next, given constant mortality rates 
(Hinde, 2007, pp.222).  As can be seen in Figure 1, since the 1980’s, the OECD average TFR has 
been below replacement level.  The Canadian TFR has consistently remained below the OECD 
average.
A number of factors have contributed to these fertility declines.  In economic terms, as women in 
developed nations have attained higher educational levels, higher earnings, and increased labour 
force participation rates in relation to men, the opportunity cost of having children has increased. 
In tandem with this have been sociological and attitudinal changes: women’s growing career 
aspirations have diminished the importance of having children relative to starting a career.  As 
women’s career paths have developed and the prevalence of two-earner families increased, there 
has been a growing incompatibility between work and family life (van de Kaa, 2002, pp.6). 
1 TFR is not without drawbacks when used as a predictor for future population growth.  As Sobotka (2004, pp.213) 
demonstrates, the tempo-adjusted indicator of TFR (cohort total fertility rates) may be a more accurate measure of current 
fertility, as it takes into account delays in childbearing that many countries are undergoing.
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Further to this, economic uncertainties, especially since the 1990’s, have made many young 
people hesitant to start families. These factors have led to the increasing postponement of 
childbearing and the choice to have fewer children in developed countries (d’Addio, 2005, 
pp.27).
Though these factors undoubtedly impact fertility, the exact effect that they have on the 
aggregate total fertility rate is less clear.  Prior to the 1990’s, there was a negative correlation 
between fertility rates at the aggregate level and female labour force participation and education 
rates (Kohler, 2006, pp.15).  Since the 1990’s, these correlations have become positive.  One 
possible explanation for this reversal revolves around institutional arrangements, such as family 
policy, that make child rearing and female labour force participation more compatible in some 
countries than in others (Brewster, 2000, pp.271). 
This explanation for the reversal in correlations should especially be of interest to policy makers 
hoping to use family policies to stem fertility declines.  Traditionally, family policy has been 
interpreted in economic terms, through tax breaks, direct cash transfers, or parental benefits. 
These policies aim to decrease direct costs of childrearing.  However, countries that have 
successfully reversed fertility decline trends in recent decades, such as Sweden and France, have 
also acknowledged the importance of sociological determinants of fertility.  Policies that 
promote gender equity and ease work-life balance, such as job-protected parental leaves and 
child care provision, have become increasingly important (d’Addio, 2005, pp.70).  This more 
holistic approach to family policy has arguably been successful in these countries.
In Canada, the various provinces have approaches to family policy that range from the more 
traditional to the more holistic.  Some provinces have opted to focus mainly on financial 
components of family policy through tax breaks and cash transfers.  Others, however, have 
attached equal importance to parental leave policies and child care accessibility.  It remains to be 
seen whether the provinces’ respective approaches to family policy have impacted their ability to 
stem fertility declines.
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1.2. RESEARCH PROBLEM
In this paper, I focus on fertility rates because of the growing importance of declining fertility 
rates in Canada.  As the Canadian welfare state has developed, family policy has become a key 
component of Canadian social policy.  A variety of family policies to help parents balance work 
life with child bearing and child rearing have been adopted in each of the Canadian provinces. 
To determine whether these policies can impact fertility rates, controlled analyses must be 
conducted.  Previous Canadian studies by Phipps (2000) and Hyatt (1991) have focused on the 
impact of parental monetary leave benefits on fertility.  Milligan (2001) and Duclos (2001) 
looked at Quebec’s baby bonuses, universal allowances, and tax credit policies, while Duclos 
(2000) has looked at tax exemptions and cash transfers across the country.  
No studies, however, have been undertaken assessing the impact on fertility of policies that 
lower indirect costs of childbearing, such as unpaid job-protected parental leave length.2  Unpaid 
job-protected parental leave policy is not necessarily implemented to impact fertility rates, but it 
is an important means of lowering the opportunity cost of child bearing for working parents. The 
impact of differential unpaid job-protected parental leave policies across Canada is the focus of 
my study.
1.3. AIM AND SCOPE
The focus of this paper is on fertility rates. As a primary objective, given both the interprovincial 
differences in TFRs and in provincial parental leave policies, I investigate whether and to what 
extent cross-Canada TFRs are influenced by unpaid job-protected leave policies at the macro 
level from 1976 to 2006.
1.4. OUTLINE OF THE THESIS
The paper will begin with background information about the Canadian pan-provincial fertility, 
social policy, and family policy contexts in Section 2.  Section 3 provides overview of previous 
research on the impact of various family policies on fertility.  The theoretical framework for my 
model and my hypotheses are also outlined in this section.  In Section 4, I explain the data, 
2 No work has been done on the impact of child care policies on fertility, largely due to the lack of available data on 
child care policy across the country.
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methods, and model that will be used to test my hypotheses.  Section 5 provides the results of my 
statistical analysis and a discussion of how these results relate to my research question and 
previous research.  Finally, I conclude the paper in Section 6 by summarizing the key findings 
with regards to the research question and outlining implications for future research.
2. BACKGROUND: THE CANADIAN CONTEXT
Canada has a population of 33.5 million, and is comprised of 10 provinces and three territories. 
As the second largest land mass in the world, with a comparatively small population that is 
heavily concentrated in a few key areas, there are substantial variations in demographic, 
economic, sociological, and political factors.  Figure 2 shows the varied population density 
throughout the country.  Meanwhile, Table 1 demonstrates the wide economic spectrum in the 
country with 2007 GDP per capita figures.  The economic spectrum ranges from the oil-rich 
Alberta and industry-heavy Ontario to the comparatively smaller economies of the Maritime 
Provinces, Newfoundland, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, and Nova Scotia.  In the 
following section, I will give a brief overview of fertility trends across Canada since the 1970’s 
and then provide some background on the Canadian social policy and, more specifically, family 
policy context.
2.1. CANADIAN FERTILITY TRENDS SINCE THE 1970’S
Canada is no exception to the declining TFR trend in other developed countries.  As can be seen 
in Figure 1, Canada’s TFR has remained consistently lower than the OECD average.  Recent 
convergence with the OECD average has more to do with the OECD countries’ more rapid TFR 
decline than a reversal of the decline in Canada.  Within Canada there is a great deal of inter-
provincial TFR variation.  British Columbia and the Central Canadian provinces of Ontario and 
Quebec constitute one fertility pattern that is distinct from that of the Prairie Provinces of 
Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba.  Meanwhile, the Maritime Provinces, Nova Scotia, 
Newfoundland, New Brunswick, and, Prince Edward Island, have their own unique fertility 
patterns.
Figure 3 shows the TFR developments in the Prairie Provinces since 1976.  The Prairie 
Provinces have exhibited comparatively higher TFRs than the Canadian average since 1976.  All 
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three provinces started the period at or above replacement level.  However, unlike Alberta, 
Saskatchewan and Manitoba, have managed to maintain significantly higher TFRs than the 
national average from the 1990’s onwards, each at 1.9 children per woman.  The TFR in Alberta, 
though not as high as the other two provinces, is still significantly higher than the national 
average, and has experienced a more pronounced rebound since 2000.
Figure 4 shows the TFR developments in Central Canada and British Columbia since 1976.  In 
Central Canada, Ontario has been fairly consistent with the national average.  Meanwhile 
Quebec has experienced huge fluctuations, dipping to extreme lows in the 1970’s and 1980’s, 
until a rebound to around the national average in 1990.  It remained lower than the national 
average until 2005, when it surpassed both Ontario and the Canadian average.  Both of these 
provinces have experienced a rebound in TFR since around 2000, after a decade of relatively 
steady declines.  Quebec’s TFR trends are notable due to the lows that were reached in 1987 
(1.37 children per woman) and 2000 (1.42 children per woman).  It has experienced a significant 
rebound since 2000, having reached 1.62 in 2006.  This is comparable to Ontario’s much more 
modest rebound from 1.48 to 1.52 children per woman.  Meanwhile, British Columbia has 
followed a similar trend to Ontario.  Its TFR has been significantly lower than the national 
average, reaching a low of 1.38 in 2000.  British Columbia has not rebounded, and appears to 
have stabilized around the 1.4 level since 2000.
Finally, I look at the Maritime Provinces.  Figure 5 shows TFR developments in these provinces 
since 1976.  The Maritimes’ TFRs have generally been lower than the national average from 
1980 onwards, with the exception of Prince Edward Island.  There have been greater TFR 
fluctuations in these provinces, likely due to their smaller size relative to the other Canadian 
provinces.  Further, the TFR rebound since 2000 has been less pronounced in these provinces 
than the Canadian average.  One striking observation about the Maritime Provinces is that three 
of these four provinces have either reached or were close to reaching the lowest-low level of 
fertility, which Kohler et al. (2002) define as 1.3.  At this level, there is an annual decline of the 
population size by 1.5 percent in a stable population with a mean age of women at childbirth of 
30 years (Kohler, 2002, pp.642).  British Columbia and Quebec are the only other provinces in 
Canada to have almost reached this level.
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2.2. THE CANADIAN SOCIAL POLICY CONTEXT
As a federalist state, policy formulation in Canada is much more decentralized than in other 
countries.  There are three basic models of federalism governing policy formulation in Canada: 
classic federalism, shared costs federalism, and joint-decision federalism.  With classical 
federalism, programs are run exclusively by one level of government.  These include unemployment 
insurance, child benefits, and non-contributory old age pension funds at the federal level and 
worker’s compensation at the provincial level (Banting, 2005, pp.9).  Shared cost federalism involves 
the federal government financially supporting provincial programs with specific terms.  This includes 
health care funding.  Finally, joint-decision federalism requires formal approval by both provincial 
and federal levels of government before any action can take place, such as the Canada Pension Plan 
(Banting, 2005, pp.9).
The history of the Canadian welfare state begins much later than in a number of other nations, 
including the United States and Australia (Banting, 2005, pp.10).  The post-World War II period 
saw the most substantial movement towards a federally directed welfare state. During this 
period, a system of “fiscal federalism” developed, whereby a number of both universal and 
means-tested social assistance programs were supported by the federal government.  These 
programs included the introduction of Unemployment Insurance in 1941, the Universal Family 
Allowance in 1945, a universal and federal old age pension in 1951, and the Canadian Medicare 
program in the 1950’s and 1960’s (Baker, 1997, pp.7).  The ideological basis of the post-war 
welfare state was the alleviation of regional disparities and universality (Baker, 1997, pp.4).  
The tight federal reign of the post-World War II period was loosened substantially in the 1960’s. 
In its quest for cultural sovereignty within Canada, Quebec would help to move Canada away 
from a centralized federalist state.  Quebec’s successful push for more autonomy in creating its 
policies set off a general push back effect amongst all the provinces, and the 1960’s saw the 
emergence of a semi-centralized federalist state.  Whereas programs enacted in the 1940’s and 
1950’s tended to give Ottawa the dominant role, policies introduced from the 1960’s onwards gave 
more scope to provincial governments (Banting, 2005, pp.17).
From the 1960’s until the mid-1990’s, the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP) was in place.  CAP 
was a federal cost sharing program whereby the federal and provincial governments split the cost 
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for social programs 50/50 (Collier, 2007, pp.12).  However, the 1990’s was yet another landmark 
decade for social policy in Canada.  During the early 1990’s, the Conservative Party was in 
power and an ideological transformation took place, as political focus shifted to market 
capitalism and economic globalization.  As Banting (2005, pp.27) outlines, globalization for 
Canada meant more integration with the United States through the 1992 signing of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  It also meant a louder conservative voice in the 
Canadian political arena.  Instead of a focus on universality, the welfare state became centered 
on need and work incentives (Baker, 1997, pp.4).  In this era of budget tightening, CAP was 
replaced by the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST) in 1996.
The CHST combined CAP funding with health care transfers and reduced the overall transfer 
amount.  This program also gave much more discretion to the provinces in deciding how to 
allocate this funding between health costs and other social services.  The key point here is that 
since the CHST was introduced, social programs, such as family policy, have come into direct 
competition with escalating health costs for their budgets (Collier, 2007, pp.12).  With fewer 
constraints tied to CHST funding, it has become increasingly apparent how each province 
prioritizes various social policies. 
As alluded to above, the social policy context within each province is unique.  From the 1960’s, 
as provinces were given a more powerful voice, ideological differences between the provinces 
have been increasingly apparent.  The traditional “have” provinces, Ontario, British Columbia, 
and Alberta, so called due to their larger economies, have tended to take a more conservative 
approach towards social policy.  The conservative approach is characterized by the minimal 
interventionist mentality.  This attitude was demonstrated in these provinces’ opposition to 
universal health care in the 1950’s and 1960’s (Banting, 2005, pp.23).  Saskatchewan, 
meanwhile, though similar to Alberta in industry, was the forefather of the universal health care 
system and more social democratic in its approach to the welfare state. Quebec has also been 
more social democratic in its social policy scope, and has viewed social policy as an important 
tool in creating its distinct society (Banting, 2005, pp.6).  The Maritime Provinces have largely 
been proponents for regional equalization, and have had fewer economic resources to devote to 
social policy. In the following section, I will see how these differences in attitudes towards social 
policy have played out for family policy across Canada, and in particular for leave policy.
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2.3. CANADIAN FAMILY POLICY CONTEXT
As outlined, the federal and provincial governments are severally responsible for social policies, 
and the degree to which the federal government influences social policy varies.  For some social 
services, such as health care, there is national legislation directing the policy framework that the 
provinces must take.  Family policy, however, does not fall under a national directive, and the 
most prominent federal government impact on family policy is felt in the financial realm.
Family policy can be divided into benefits that help reduce the direct cost of childrearing and 
those that help to reduce indirect costs, for instance by easing the worker-parent conflicts that 
exist when parents are in the labour force.  Direct cost-reducing policies in Canada include tax 
credits, tax benefits, tax exemptions, direct cash transfers, and parental leave benefits.  Indirect 
cost-reducing policies include parental leave policies and policies that increase availability, 
accessibility, and quality of child care.  The federal government and all provinces have instituted 
family policies to some degree.   I will focus on parental leave policies in this paper.  However, I 
also provide background on other aspects of family policy.  Generosity with respect to one 
component of family policy is not always reflective of the entire family policy context in a 
province.
2.3.1. DIRECT COST-REDUCING POLICIES
The federal government has been responsible for fiscal deductions for children since 1918 and 
Family Allowances since 1945. Since their inception, these programs have changed dramatically. 
In 1993, during the aforementioned period of budget tightening, the Family Allowance program 
was abolished along with Non-Refundable Tax Credits.  Instead, the Refundable Tax Credit 
remained and was renamed the Child Tax Benefit (CTB).3  The CTB is an income-tested benefit 
and varies depending on the number of children in the family (Canada Revenue Agency, 2008, 
pp.8).  The impact of the CTB is somewhat debatable when compared to similar programs in 
other countries.  In a 2003 study, Mendelson found that among Canada, the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and Australia, four countries with similar child benefit programs, the Canadian 
CTB was the least generous program (Mendelson, 2003, pp.10).
3 A Refundable Tax Credit is a tax credit that can reduce the tax owed below zero, resulting in a net payment to the 
taxpayer.  The CTB is available to families with incomes under a cut-off of around $74,000.  
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Provincial governments also provide tax benefits and family allowances to eligible families, but 
these programs vary from province to province. Finances Québec conducted a cross-province 
comparison of these benefits programs in 2009, and the results of this comparison can be found 
in Table 2.  The comparison takes into account family-benefit programs and refundable tax 
credits for families not receiving social assistance, as well as provincial grant tax reductions 
relating to children.  The spectrum of family benefits across the country is substantial.
The most generous province is Quebec, which even on an international scale tops family friendly 
countries such as Finland, France, and Iceland for percentage of GDP spent on families 
(Finances Quebec, 2009, pp.5).  Although British Columbia has a higher maximum monthly 
payment of $1,332, this payment is provided only to families who reach a much lower income 
threshold than Quebec. The two other “have” provinces in addition to British Columbia, Ontario 
and Alberta, have higher benefits than other provinces, but nowhere near the level of Quebec. 
The Maritime Provinces, along with Manitoba, have the lowest benefits with very low income 
ceilings as well.
2.3.2. INDIRECT COST-REDUCING POLICIES
In reviewing the indirect benefits across the country, I review policies that impact parental leave 
as well as policies that impact cost, accessibility, and quality of child care.4  At the federal level, 
parental leave policies fall under the Employment Insurance Act.  This implies that benefit levels 
are largely consistent across the provinces over time, with few exceptions.  Until the early 
1990’s, parental leave benefits were significantly lower than in many other social welfare states 
around the world.  From 1971 to 1984, job-protected leave was granted only to biological 
mothers for a minimum of 15 weeks under federal legislation.  In 1984 federally legislated 
parental leave was introduced.  This implied an additional 10 week period that could be taken by 
either the mother or the father of the child.5  This ten week period was extended to 15 weeks in 
1999 (Campbell, 2006, pp.181).6
4 Policies surrounding parental benefit levels and child care costs are not strictly indirect cost-reducing measures, but 
are important complements to the leave length and child care access and quality policies.  As such, they are included 
in the indirect-cost reducing policy section.
5 Under the 1984 legislation, adopted parents also gained the right to this 10 week leave period.
6 There are no conditions requiring maternity leave to be taken prior to the birth of a child; however, there is a two-
week waiting period for benefits payment once an application has been received by the federal government.
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In 2001, there were major legislative changes to the Employment Insurance Act which entitled 
parents to up to 50 weeks of partially compensated leave after the birth of the first child.  The 
first 15 weeks are considered maternity leave for birth mothers only, while the remaining 35 
weeks can be taken by either parent.  The compensation level for this leave has been capped at 
55 percent of income, as of 2004, with maximum insurable earnings of $42,300 (Campbell, 
2006, pp.184).
Looking at the 2001 amendments from an international perspective, Canada is now more 
generous than the United Kingdom and the United States in terms of parental leave benefits, but 
falls short of the policies in other family friendly countries such as Sweden and France.  Sweden, 
for instance, has allowed around 55 weeks of income-related benefits paying up to 80 percent of 
a parent’s income and 13weeks of flat rate benefits to parents after the birth of a child.7  Further, 
this time can be used flexibly until the child is eight (Grant, 2004, pp.124).  In Europe in general, 
the wage replacement rate is around 70 to 80 percent for a minimum of one year (Campbell, 
2006, pp.184).
At the provincial level, each province has its own employment standards legislation that must 
comply with the federal Employment Insurance Act.  Although only Quebec has opted to top up 
the parental benefit level, the maximum unpaid parental leave length has been topped up to 
various degrees by different provinces.  Table 3 shows the maternity, parental, maximum job-
protected leave, and continuous employment requirements for each province in 2006.  Again, 
Quebec has opted to provide a far lengthier job-protected parental leave than the rest of Canada, 
with 70 weeks of job-protected parental leave.  In terms of compensation, Quebec provides 70 
percent of earnings for 30 weeks and 55 percent of earnings for 25 weeks, with maximum 
insurable earnings of $62,000 as of 2009 (Finances Québec, 2009, pp.35).  Manitoba is the only 
other province that has enhanced the minimum federal parental leave length, with 54 weeks of 
job-protected leave.  The only compensation a person can receive on this leave, however, is the 
55 percent paid into employment insurance.
The remaining provinces provide only the basic benefits required under the Employment  
Insurance Act.  However, where most provinces allow either parent to take full advantage of the 
7 The actual leave lengths are 390 and 90 days respectively, but these have been divided by seven for comparability 
with the Canadian context.
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parental leave, Alberta, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island cap the combined length of 
parental leave at 37 week for the first two provinces and 35 weeks for Prince Edward Island.  All 
provinces except for Quebec and Manitoba cap the combined maternity and parental leave at 52 
weeks (Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, 2006).  As such, although the 
parental benefit level remains fairly consistent across the country over time, the maximum job-
protected parental leave length does vary from province to province over time (ten Cate, 2003, 
pp.7).
Finally, I look at policies related to child care at the federal and provincial levels.  Federally, the 
only component of child care policy that the government directly facilitates relates to child care 
costs.  The Universal Child Care Benefit (UCCB) is a direct cash transfer in the amount of $100 
per month per child under six.  Since 2001, the federal government has given transfers to the 
provincial governments through the Early Childhood Development Initiative and the Multilateral 
Framework on Early Learning and Child Care.  These transfers specify that funding must be used 
on provincially regulated child care and early learning programs for children under the age of 
six.  As such, the federal government has an indirect impact on child care quality by encouraging 
the funding of regulated child care (Cool, 2004, pp.1).  International rankings of child care 
programs, however, have found that the federal government’s lack of direction may be to the 
detriment of child care accessibility, quality, and cost.  In a 2008 evaluation of 25 OECD 
countries’ performance in the child care sphere, Canada tied for last place with Ireland 
(Adamson, 2008, pp.2).
With no national directive on child care, the provinces take the bulk of the responsibility, and 
there is wide variation in their policies (Collier, 2007, pp.5).  Table 4 summarizes coverage rates, 
proportion of child care spaces that are regulated and median monthly parental fees for child care 
from across the country.  Quebec, once again, has taken a comprehensive approach to enhancing 
child care quality and accessibility while greatly decreasing child care cost.  Its $5 a day program 
has put a cap on the amount that all parents have to pay for childcare, while its coverage rates are 
by far the highest in Canada.  Additionally 87 percent of its regulated childcare is not-for-profit, 
which numerous studies have found are higher quality than for-profit child care facilities 
(Friendly, 2009).
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Manitoba has the second lowest fees in Canada and is the only other province to legislate a 
maximum monthly fee for child care for funded child care centers.  Manitoba and Saskatchewan 
have the highest proportion of regulated child care centers that are not-for-profit, at 94 percent 
and 100 percent respectively.  Saskatchewan, however, also has the lowest coverage rate of 
regulated child care spaces, at 5.4 percent.  The remaining provinces vary substantially, with the 
Maritime Provinces faring the worst.  Their median monthly fees range from $467 per month in 
New Brunswick to $716 per month in Nova Scotia.  They also have the lowest proportion of 
regulated spots that are not-for-profit.  Alberta stands out as a “have” province with extremely 
low coverage rates for regulated spots, with just 12.2 percent of children zero to 12 having a 
regulated child care spot available to them.  In provinces, such as Alberta, Saskatchewan, and 
Manitoba, with low coverage rates, the proportion of children cared for in informal 
arrangements, by both relatives and non-relatives, is the highest (Bushnik, 2005, pp.9).
Overall, the family policy context is varied, but some patterns do emerge.  Quebec, in all 
instances, has surfaced as a leader in family policies – both financial and non-financial – going 
above and beyond any existent federally legislated requirements.  Meanwhile, in the Prairies, 
Manitoba appears to have the most child-friendly policy environment and Alberta the least. 
Ontario and British Columbia are middle of the road, despite being much wealthier than most 
other provinces.  Finally, the Maritime Provinces, likely due to their lack of financial resources, 
generally have less family-friendly environments, with Newfoundland performing the best likely 
due to its more plentiful resources.  Even these provinces, however, still perform better in some 
cases than Alberta, the province with the highest GDP per capita in the country.
3. PREVIOUS RESEARCH AND THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
3.1. PREVIOUS RESEARCH
3.1.1. OVERVIEW OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH
There has been a substantial amount of research on the impact of family policy on fertility. 
Previous literature reviews by Sleebos (2003), Gauthier (2007), and Lattimore (2008), in 
addition to articles collected using JSTOR, internet search engines, and the reference sections of 
various articles, brought to light over 50 such articles.  Only 26 of these articles were selected for 
12
further analysis for my paper.  These were articles that most closely fit with the research 
question, were frequently cited in other texts as foundational studies in the area, or provided 
background for the family policy context in Canada. Table 5 summarizes the countries, years of 
study, methods, data, dependent variables, and key policy variables for each of the selected 
studies in this literature review.
Previous research on the impact of family policy on fertility changes has largely revolved around 
the impact of policies that diminish direct costs of child bearing and child rearing, such as cash 
transfers, tax breaks, parental leave benefits, and policies aimed at reducing child care costs. 
Direct cost-reducing policies provide the easiest measurement proxies, as there is often a 
monetary variable that can be calculated.  Previous quantitative research on the impact of 
indirect cost-reducing family policies, such as maternity or parental leave and child care access 
are less widespread, especially in Canada, where child care data is scarce and parental leave 
policies quite diverse.
Previous research has largely been focused in Europe, but also includes North America and Asia. 
Countries analyzed in this literature review include Austria, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, the Nordic countries as a group, Norway, various combinations of OECD countries, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States.  I focused on the studies on more recent 
findings from 2000 onwards, as these were predominantly the studies with the best data available 
and the most conclusive findings.  However, I also included one pioneering study from the 
1980’s, Ekert (1986), and seven studies from the 1990’s, four of which were foundational studies 
in the use of macro data in the analysis of family policy’s impact of fertility.
The methods used in these studies included qualitative analyses, such as Gupta (2006), 
applications of economic models, such as Yasuoko (2008), and econometric analyses.  In this 
paper, I focus mostly on studies that employed econometric methods to explore the linkage 
between fertility and family policy.  Whether each study used macro-data or micro-data is 
another important methodological distinction.  As aggregate data will be used in my analysis, I 
have included 12 studies that used aggregate macro-level data.  Aggregate data was especially 
common in the cross-country analyses and regional comparisons within countries.  The 
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remaining 13 studies employed micro-data from labour market surveys, national registers, and 
various other social surveys.
3.1.2. PARENTAL LEAVE POLICIES FINDINGS
Table 6 summarizes the results of each of the 26 articles, indicating whether the policy variables 
in question had a positive and significant, very small positive and not significant, or no 
significant impact on fertility rates.  Some studies also looked at the impact on the female labour 
force supply, and the results for this variable are also included.
The studies looking at the impact of parental leave on fertility have somewhat uncertain results. 
Three of these studies, Lalive (2005), d’Addio (2005), and Averett (2001), found a positive 
significant impact on fertility while four found a positive non-significant impact, and three found 
no significant impact.  Lalive (2005) used micro-data to determine that the probability of having 
a child within the three-year period following changes in parental leave policy was 4.9 percent 
higher than before the changes.  The authors interpret their results as an indication that the timing 
and number of children were both impacted by these policy changes.  Meanwhile, d’Addio used 
aggregate data and cross-country variations to show the positive significant impact of longer 
parental leave length of TFR.  Averett used micro-data and found that the presence of maternity 
leave among young working women in the United States increased the probability of a second or 
higher order birth.
The four studies that had less significant results included Ronsen (1999), Duvander (2005), 
Winegarden (1995), and the qualitative study of Gupta (2006).  Ronsen (1999) looked at Finland 
and Norway, finding that the impact was positive, but very small.  The impact of parental leave 
on fertility was slightly larger in Finland.  Meanwhile, Duvander (2005) also found mixed 
results, with a positive significant impact on shorter and medium paternity leaves on fertility in 
Sweden, but no such impact of longer term paternity leaves.   Winegarden (1995) found no 
significant impact of paid maternity leave on general fertility rates, but did conclude that the 
positive impacts on reducing infant mortality rates and increasing female labour force 
participation rates without decreasing fertility.  Finally, the study with no significant results was 
the cross-country macro comparison by Gauthier (1997).
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3.1.3. CHILD CARE POLICIES FINDINGS
Three of the 26 studies found positive and significant effects of child care policies on fertility, 
while six found a positive but not significant impact on fertility, and two found no significant 
impact of child care on fertility.    All three of the studies that found a positive significant impact 
of child care were based on aggregate data – two cross country comparisons in the OECD 
nations, Castles (2003) and d’Addio (2005), and one inter-canton comparison in Switzerland, 
Bonoli (2008).  In each case, the authors were quick to note that the use of aggregate data could 
not control for a number of cross-country variations in many variables.  Del Boca (2007) looked 
at the impact of child care cost on female labour force participation and use of child care in Italy, 
finding that lowering access costs to child care had a positive and significant impact on each 
variable.
The five studies that found positive but not significant impacts of child care on fertility were the 
qualitative and theory-based articles, in addition to Kravdal (1996) and Gauthier (1997).  While 
Kravdal (1996) found significant impacts of child care on third birth rates in one regression, he 
also found that controlling for female labour force participation made this effect insignificant. 
Gauthier (1997), meanwhile, does not specifically measure for the impact of child care, but 
concludes that the higher impact of family benefits in the Nordic countries is related to in-kind 
benefits, like subsidized child care.
3.1.4. BENEFITS/CASH INCENTIVES/TAX BREAK POLICIES FINDINGS
The third category of policies explored in these papers was policies involving financial benefits, 
either through tax benefits or direct cash transfers.  Of the 26 articles, 11 studies explored the 
impact of financial benefits on fertility.  Five of these studies found positive and significant 
results while six found positive but an extremely small or not significant impact on fertility. 
Ekert (1986) was a foundational study that examined the impact of family benefits on fertility in 
France in the 1970’s.  Ekert found a small but significant impact of increased family benefits on 
the total fertility rate.  A Canadian study, Zhang (1994) found similar results looking at a number 
of financial benefits, including tax exemptions, tax credits, family allowances, and maternity 
benefits from 1921 to 1983 using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression similar to Ekert. 
Likewise, Bonoli used micro-data with OLS to the same effect.  Two other Canadian studies that 
15
used more complicated methods, such as Duclos (2001) using linear probability models and 
Milligan (2001) using a multinomial logit model, also had similar results when looking at 
Quebec’s unique baby bonus policies in the 1980’s and 1990’s.  
Six studies that explored the impact of financial incentives on fertility had weak positive 
findings.  Hoem (1993) found that the “Speed Premium” in Sweden did impact the TFR, but 
largely impacted the timing of children after the first child rather than the total number.  Further, 
Ekert (2002) found a positive impact of transfers on fertility in France when compared to Britain, 
which provided less generous financial benefits.  The positive results found in the remaining 
studies were small.  For instance, Hyatt (1991) found that fertility would increase by 0.09 to 0.26 
percent for every one percent increase in Unemployment Insurance maternity benefits in Canada. 
The two micro-data studies by Hoem (2001) and Phipps (2000) found no significant impact of 
leave benefits on fertility.  Phipps (2000) was a Canadian study that interpreted the lack of 
fertility response and labour market response of women to enhanced maternity leave benefits as 
lack of policy awareness by potential beneficiaries.  Hoem (2001) found only tempo impacts of a 
change in parental leave policy in Austria in the 1990’s.
3.1.5. SUMMARY COMMENTS
One noteworthy observation that applies to a number of the studies looking at cross-national 
comparisons, and is also relevant for my cross-provincial comparison, was made by Brewster 
(2000, pp.285).  In his own review of the literature pertaining to family policy and fertility, he 
noted that the ability to capture the finer points of family policies, for instance detailed 
conditions surrounding leave policies, detracts from many policy analysis studies.  Further to 
this, the inability to capture a broader social context can also create misleading results in these 
studies (Brewster, 2000, pp.286).
In her first review of the literature, Gauthier (2001) also makes a relevant observation that many 
demographic responses to family policies have tended to be short-term and, to a large extent, 
mainly impacting the timing of fertility rather than on the completed cohort fertility (Gauthier, 
2001, pp.8).   Bongaarts (2008, pp.49), however, demonstrates that policies that decrease the 
mean age at childbearing by 0.1 year per year could increase period TFR by as much as 20 
percent.  As such, even if the primary impact of family policy is on the timing of fertility, this 
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does not necessarily mean that family policy is ineffective.  He concludes that policies impacting 
the tempo of fertility could actually be a very powerful and simple way to increase period 
fertility rates.
Overall, the implications of previous research for my study are not so straightforward.  The 
ability to measure the impact of various family policies on fertility is shown to be difficult by 
these studies, especially due to the difficulty of finding appropriate proxies for many of the 
economic, sociological, and political factors that must be measured.  Furthermore, the focus on 
direct cost-reducing policies, especially in the Canadian literature, is an indication that indirect-
cost reducing policies have been more difficult to measure.  This gap in the Canadian literature, 
however, provides further motivation for my study.
3.2. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
There are a number of theoretical frameworks for analyzing fertility decisions, which include 
economic, sociological, and institutional frameworks.  One common thread among these 
frameworks is their inability to consistently explain empirical variations in fertility patterns from 
the 1960’s to present time (Brewster, 2000, pp.290).  In the following section, I briefly analyze 
fertility patterns using traditional economic and sociological perspectives.  I then demonstrate 
that the inclusion of institutional factors, such as family policy environment, in economic and 
sociological fertility theories is necessary to explain fertility trends since the 1990’s at the 
aggregate level.  From this analysis, I determine the most appropriate theoretical model for my 
analysis.
3.2.1. ECONOMIC THEORY
Since the 1960’s, economic theory explaining fertility behaviour has largely revolved around 
Becker’s (1960) New Home Economics model.  Simply put, this demand model assumes the 
people have varying tastes for goods and services, and children are considered one such good. 
Given people’s time and income constraints, people will maximize their individual utility 
functions by allocating their time and money to the goods that maximize utility.  If the cost of a 
good,  in this context represented by the costs of childbearing and childrearing, increases, then 
people will demand less of the good. The New Home Economics model also factors in the trade-
off between the quantity of children and their quality.  The model assumes that the income effect 
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on the demand for child quality is of a larger positive magnitude than the income impact on 
demand for child quantity (Schultz, 2001, pp.5580).
In empirical research to date, the New Home Economics model has been applied on the basis of 
a traditional gender relationship (Gauthier, 1997, pp.296).  As such, income increases, measured 
by family and male income, are predicted to positively impact the demand for a child. 
Conversely, poor economic horizons, represented by such factors as unemployment, can act as 
deterrents to child bearing.  Meanwhile, price factors, with include increases in the opportunity 
cost of child bearing and child rearing, such as higher female income, education, and labour 
force participation, would decrease the demand for a child.  Butz and Ward (1979, pp.318) 
demonstrate the importance of distinguishing between households with employed wives and 
those without, especially from the 1960’s onwards.  The results of their study show that the 
distinction between male income and female wages to measure income versus price effects on 
child bearing was important in any empirical model assessing the impact of economic factors on 
fertility.8
Becker’s economic theory has and continues to be foundational theory in a number of empirical 
studies evaluating the impact of various economic and political factors on fertility, including the 
majority of the studies in my Previous Research section.9  It has not, however, gone without 
criticism.  Gauthier (2001) points out that the neoclassical underpinnings of this model are that 
individuals have full information of costs and benefits of various alternatives and that the 
decision to have a child is the result of an economically rational decision.   Numerous scholars 
have been critical of these ideas (Gauthier, 2001, pp.4).  Though a valid point, this criticism does 
not necessarily mean that the model will not predict correctly.  However, other scholars who 
have criticized the lack of sociological determinants in the model have pinpointed a factor that 
can impact the ability of the model to predict correctly: changing tastes.  Through a number of 
qualitative observations, Cleland and Wilson (1987) demonstrate that sociological factors, 
namely ideational change, are key determinants of fertility.
8 Butz and Ward tested the hypothesis that countercyclical fertility, that is fertility increases in poor economic times, 
could be attributed to lower female wages and vice versa.
9 These studies include Apps (2004), Ekert (1986), Ekert (2002), Gauthier (1997), Gauthier (2007), Milligan (2001), 
Yasuoko (2008), and Zhang (1996).
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Recent empirical trends have also plagued the Becker model.  The Becker model had been 
relatively successful in explaining the earlier described Fertility Transition of the 1960’s until the 
1990’s.  Over this time span, female labour force participation and female education rates 
increased throughout much of the developed world, thereby increasing the opportunity cost for 
childrearing.  As Becker’s theory would predict, fertility rates dropped dramatically over this 
time period.  However, empirical evidence has not supported this theory since the 1990’s, when a 
reversal in the price effects with respect to women’s earnings and fertility emerged.  Since the 
1990’s, a positive correlation was shown to exist between women’s earnings and labour force 
participation and total fertility in Europe at the aggregate level (Kohler, 2006, pp.15). As seen in 
Figure 6, Canada has been no exception to the positive correlation between female labour force 
participation and fertility rates since the 1990’s.  Given this reversal, I look to other offsetting 
variables within the theory to explain Canadian fertility rates from the 1990’s onwards.
3.2.2. THE MODIFIED ECONOMIC APPROACH
Easterlin (1987) attempts to address the exclusion of sociological factors in economic fertility 
theory.  Easterlin’s model takes into consideration family income levels relative to socially-
produced expectations or aspirations (Pampel, 1993, pp.496).  In this model, relative income is 
defined as the ratio of the relative magnitude of one’s "earnings potential" and one’s "material 
aspirations" (Abeysinghe, 1991, pp.53).  Income potential is dependent on current income and 
perceived future earning power, which in turn depends on competition for jobs, opportunities for 
promotion, and the tightness of the labour market.  Easterlin hypothesized that weaker economic 
prospects of a cohort with respect to those of its parents would induce demographic adjustments 
(Macunovich, 2000, pp.236).  Extending this idea to fertility, it follows that the higher the 
income potential, the higher the fertility (Pampel, 1993, pp.496).
According to Easterlin’s theory, cohort size is the key determinant of both income potential and 
the expected standard of living.  Specifically, larger cohorts face crowding out in the labour 
market due to more workers, stronger competition for jobs, fewer opportunities for promotion, 
and lower real wages.  Comparative size of a current cohort to that of a previous cohort, 
therefore, should provide a measure of income potential relative to the income of the parental 
generation, or the expected standard of living (Pampel, 1993, pp.497).  Typically, relative cohort 
size has been defined as the ratio of the number of persons aged 30 to 64 to the number of 
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persons aged 15 to 29.  Easterlin calculated relative cohort size with the male population only 
(Abeysinghe, 1991, pp.54).
One noteworthy point in comparing the Becker and Easterlin models is that they do not 
contradict each other with respect to their predictions.  They do, however, cite different 
mechanisms as driving forces behind certain factors.  Most notably, female labour force 
participation is driven, according to the Becker model, by increases in female wages.  Increased 
wages increase the opportunity cost of non-participation for women who are not working. 
Meanwhile, in the Easterlin model, higher female labour force participation rates are driven by 
economic pressures.  According to this model, if family economic aspirations are not being met 
by a male earner alone, then there is incentive for the female partner to enter the workforce 
(Oppenheimer, 1976, pp.436).
Empirically applied, relative cohort size has been found to be a successful predictor of Canadian 
fertility from the post-World War II period until the 1970’s (Abeysinghe, 1991, pp.53).  From 
this period onwards in Canada, and even prior to this in Europe, the relative cohort size theory 
has been found to be less successful when tested empirically. Oppenheimer (1976) argues that a 
potential reason for this failure is the exclusion of female economic contributions to the family. 
She argues that the growing financial contribution of women to household income has 
increasingly acted as a buffer to lower male income during hard economic times.  Another 
important consideration is explored by Pampel (1993, pp.511).  Pampel found that the integration 
of institutional factors, such as the degree to which a government ensures social protection and 
high rates of female labour force participation, act as cushions against the impacts of large cohort 
size on economic well-being.
Overall, the Easterlin model is more comprehensive than the pure economic model of Becker 
due to its inclusion of sociological factors.  However, given its exclusion of institutional 
considerations, the model still shares shortcomings with the Becker model when tested 
empirically with fertility data from the 1990’s onwards.  As noted by Esping-Andersen (2007, 
pp.20), when theory and empirics are at odds, alternative explanations must be sought.
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3.2.3. INSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Brewster and Rindfuss (2000, pp.279) seek to overcome the discrepancy between theory and 
empirical evidence by focusing on the role of institutional factors in easing the worker-mother 
conflict.  They note that in countries where women have not been able to successfully combine 
childrearing with work, or where there are high degrees of role incompatibility, fertility has 
declined substantially.  From this, they conclude that theory attempting to explain the fertility-
employment relationship must take into account social, economic, and institutional (i.e. policy) 
contexts (Brewster, 2000, pp.292).
Gauthier (2001) integrates institutional factors into economic theory by explaining that any 
reduction in the cost of children (as a result of public subsidy) or any increase in income (as a 
result of transfer payment) is expected to increase the demand for children (Gauthier, 2001, 
pp.4).  The same notion can be extended to in-kind benefits that diminish role incompatibility, 
such as easier access to and cheaper provision of child care and job-protected parental leave 
policies that ease the transition into and out of the labour force.  Kohler (2006, pp.41) expands on 
this notion by suggesting that institutional settings characterized by “labour market rigidities, 
insufficient child-care support and a prevalence of relatively traditional gender roles, favour an 
overall low quantum of fertility.”
Applying this theory to the Canadian context, I conclude that provinces that implement family 
policies diminishing role incompatibility over time will have the most success in stemming 
fertility declines.  Table 7 summarizes the predicted relationships between fertility and the 
variables discussed above according to the Becker and Easterlin models.
3.3. HYPOTHESES
Table 7 outlines the predicted relationships between fertility and variables impacting demand for 
children (i.e. income and opportunity costs), institutional factors, and sociological factors.  Based 
on these predicted relationships, I can hypothesize whether and how provincial job-protected 
parental leave policies have impacted fertility rates from the 1970’s to present day.
According to the New Home Economics model, I would expect that an increase in male or 
family income and enhanced economic prospects (i.e. lower unemployment) would be positively 
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associated with fertility.  However, female earnings and labour force participation would be 
negatively correlated with fertility, as traditional economic theory links these indicators to higher 
opportunity costs of child bearing (Gauthier, 1997, pp.296).  The higher the opportunity costs of 
child bearing and child rearing, all other factors remaining equal, the less likely a woman is to 
have a child.   Additionally, the Easterlin relative cohort size hypothesis would predict that as the 
relative cohort size decreases (i.e. the current cohort size increases in relation to the previous 
cohort), fertility will decline, due to the diminished relative economic prospects of the current 
cohort.
Institutional factors that decrease barriers to balancing work and family life, in this case longer 
job-protected parental leave, are expected to decrease the opportunity cost of child bearing. 
While these lowered opportunity costs can positively impact fertility rates, I note that job-
protected leave is more of a proxy for the general indirect cost-reducing policy framework in 
each province.  More generous policies are predicted to positively impact fertility. 10   Even so, 
however, it should also be mentioned that the predicted relationship between parental leave 
length and fertility is not necessarily positive.  While job protected leaves enable flexibility into 
and out of the job market for new parents, it also means that parents who take longer parental 
leaves may lose out on human capital gains while removed from the labour force.  Additionally, 
since to a large extent, this is an unpaid leave, there are opportunity costs to taking an extended 
leave in some provinces (Averett, 2001, pp.406).  As such, the predicted relationship between 
fertility and unpaid job-protected parental leave is uncertain.
Another noteworthy point is the target population of this policy.  While the largest portion of 
job-protected leave can be taken by either parent, traditionally the uptake for parental leave has 
been much lower for men than for women in Canada (OECD, 2006, pp.7).  It has been argued 
that because female income tends to be lower than male income on average, there is greater 
incentive for women to take unpaid or partially-compensated leaves with upper limits. 
Furthermore, access to job-protected parental leave is limited to those who pay into employment 
insurance and have had some form of continuous employment in the months preceding the leave. 
10It is not argued that this policy alone is very likely to influence fertility rates, but that it is an important and valid 
measure of how family friendly the policy environment is in each province, and will be treated as an indicator of 
this.  This is explored further in the discussion section of this paper.
22
As such, parental leave policies tend to be targeted towards parents with relatively stable 
employment.  In an analysis of eligibility for employment insurance among new mothers in 
Canada, Phipps (2000, pp.420) finds that new mothers with less than a high school diploma are 
much less likely to be eligible for maternity unemployment insurance than new mothers in any 
other educational group.
4. MODEL, DATA, AND METHODS
To test my hypotheses, I will conduct panel data regressions on aggregate-level data maintained 
by Statistics Canada.  As my theoretical model indicates, the variables that should be included in 
my statistical analysis include a measurement of fertility and factors impacting demand for 
children, such as family income, female earnings, unemployment, and female labour force 
participation.  Institutional considerations measuring the ease with which a parent can transition 
back into the workforce following child bearing should also be factored into my analysis. 
Finally, a variable measuring the relative cohort aspirations should be included. Given available 
data, it is possible to isolate some of these variables for inclusion in my model.  There are, 
however, limitations regarding how targeted this analysis can be and how accurately the 
available data will measure the exact variables outlined in my theory.  As such, most of the 
variables in my empirical model will be proxies for the theoretical variables.
4.1. MODEL SPECIFICATION
My empirical model will use TFR, the dependent variable, as a measurement of fertility (tfr). 
Independent variables are as follows. For demand factors, male income in 2006 Canadian dollars 
(m_income) will measure family income, female earnings in 2006 Canadian dollars (f_earnings) 
will measure the opportunity cost of child bearing and rearing for women, female labour force 
participation (flfp) will measure the relative position of women in the labour force and in society, 
and unemployment (unemp) will measure general economic conditions in each province. 
Institutional considerations will be measured by the maximum months of unpaid job-protected 
parental leave (pl) available to a mother in each province, while relative aspirations will be 
measured by the relative cohort size (rcs) of 30 to 64 year old men to 15 to 29 year old men. 
Each of the dependent variables will be lagged by one year.  The TFR will be logged so that the 
percentage change per unit increase in each independent variable can be calculated.
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The model is written as follows:
lnTFRt = αi + δt + β1m_incomeit-1 + β2f_ earningsit-1  + β3 flfpt-1 + β5unempit-1 + β6 plit-1 + β7 rcsit-1 
+ uit
In this model, αi represents the unobserved provincial fixed effects and δt represents the time 
effects that are common in all the provinces at any given time but vary over time. The error 
terms, uit, are zero mean random variables that vary across the provinces over time.  The error 
term is assumed to capture the province-specific effects that are fixed over time and the 
remainder of the disturbance (Breau, 2007, pp.11).  The model assumes away any reverse 
causation or endogeneity of the independent variables.  A limitation of this specification is 
explored further in the Discussion section of this paper.
4.2. DATA SOURCES AND SAMPLE
Table 8 outlines the data sources for the proposed theoretical model.  Most variables were 
obtained from Statistics Canada’s Canadian Socio-Economic Information Management System 
(CANSIM) database.  This database contains a number of aggregate Canadian socioeconomic 
statistics.  However, in some cases, CANSIM did not contain data for the whole period 1976 to 
2006.  As such, various Statistics Canada publications were used to piece together the missing 
data.
The TFR data was obtained from CANSIM, Statistics Canada Births and Deaths publications 
and a Statistics Canada Health Reports publication by Ford and Nault.  It should be noted that 
TFR information for Newfoundland was not available prior to 1990.11  Unpaid job-protected 
parental leave data from 2000 onwards was obtained from the Human Resources and Skills 
Development Canada (HRSDC) website, provided in Table 8.  Data for the period 1976 to 2000 
was found in a study by Cate (2003).  The data for the remaining independent variables was 
obtained from various tables in CANSIM, outlined in Table 8.12  
11The Births and Deaths series of publications, catalogue number 84F0210XPB, were used for various years after 
1994, the Ford and Nault publication for years prior to 1994, and CANSIM for 2000 onwards.
12 The sources for the CANSIM average total male and female income variables and the female labour force 
participation rates by province were obtained from tables in the Canadian Labour Force Survey.  Data for relative 
cohort size was found in CANSIM, using census figures.
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Table 8 also outlines the sample size for each of the variables.  Data for all the variables, with the 
exception of TFR, could be obtained with consistent measurement from the period 1976 to 2006 
for all ten provinces, totaling 31 years of observations.  As TFR data could not be obtained for 
Newfoundland prior to 1990, this limits the number of observations to 286.
4.3. METHOD
I use panel data to test my hypothesis.  Panel data allows me to capture both the dynamic (time 
series) and static (cross section) aspects of the determinants of fertility (Ogwang, 2006, pp.2). 
Additionally, the increased number of observations for each variable in the sample decreases the 
likelihood of multicollinearity between explanatory variables.  As 15 years of TFR observations 
are missing for one province, Newfoundland, the panel is unbalanced.  I use two different types 
of models and compare the results of these regressions.  I use a pooled OLS regression and then 
compare the results of this regression with a fixed-effects regression.  
In the first model I use a pooled OLS model with dummies for each year.  The pooled OLS 
approach is useful in providing a base comparator for the results of the fixed effects regression. 
Panel data analysis using pooled OLS assumes that observations have the same constants.  It can 
be applied in instances where there are no significant provincial effects.  In this study, I have 
hypothesized that changes over time and variations within provinces will have an effect on 
fertility rates.  Province-specific differences in TFR are likely to breach the homoskedasticity 
assumption of OLS regressions and give rise to heterogeneity and biased OLS results (Breau, 
2007, pp.82).  To control for these specific effects, a two-way fixed-effects or random-effects 
model can be used.
Fixed effects and random effects models are alternatives to addressing the assumption of 
constant intercepts.   Each province has its own unique socioeconomic and political conditions 
that can impact fertility.   A fixed effects model assumes constant slopes, but different intercepts 
for each province.  The constant in a two-way fixed effects model will control for factors that 
vary across provinces, but are invariant within provinces, as well as for time effects that are 
common in all provinces at any given time but vary over time.  Unobserved, province-specific 
effects are assumed to be fixed and correlated with the explanatory variables.  Meanwhile, a 
random-effects model assumes that part of the unobserved province-specific effects are random 
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and uncorrelated with the explanatory variables (Breau, 2007, pp.83).  A Hausman test with my 
data reveals that the test’s null hypothesis of a significant difference between fixed-effects and 
random-effects regression results can be rejected.  As such a fixed-effects model is chosen for 
my second regression.
It is noteworthy to mention the result of a test for heteroskedasticity in my data and how I have 
dealt with this problem.  Using a likelihood ratio test for heteroskedasticity in panel data, it is 
evident that heteroskedasticity is of issue.   To ensure that the standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity, the robust post-regression command is used.  
Another important issue that comes to light from an overview of the variables is the potential for 
endogeneity.  It would appear, especially in the case of my policy variable, that at certain times 
spikes in TFR precede increases in unpaid job-protected leave while at other times the opposite 
is true.13  It is quite feasible that there are effects on the policy variable from, for instance, new 
parents in preceding time periods demanding a more child-friendly policy environment.  This is 
something that should be noted prior to any interpretation of my results.
A Hadri Lagrange Multiplier test was also conducted for non-stationarity, and it was apparent 
through the rejection of the null hypothesis of stationarity that non-stationarity was present in my 
data.  I considered and attempted some techniques to correct for non-stationarity, so that I could 
ensure spurious inferences about the relationship between my variables were not made.  In the 
end, I continued the analysis without corrections for these factors, and I factored the risk of 
spurious regression into my analysis.  A further discussion of endogeneity and non-stationarity 
issues is included in the Discussion section of this paper. 
4.4. VARIABLE DISCUSSION
It has been noted that the data being used pose a number of problems, including endogeneity and 
non-stationarity.  Given these shortcomings, it is important to perform detailed univariate and 
bivariate analyses on each of the variables prior to the multivariate analysis.    Univariate 
analysis provides a general understanding of the context in which fertility changes occurred in 
each of the provinces.  The bivariate analysis will look at the degree to which TFR is correlated 
with each of the variables in question.  In the following section, I will discuss the rationale for 
13 These concerns become especially apparent in the following section of this paper, Variable Discussion.
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the choice of variables for the empirical model and outline the trends for each of the variables in 
question.  Contextual explanations for why independent variables changed as they did are 
included in this discussion.  Finally, I look at how each variable’s trends move in relation to TFR 
trends.  Table 9 outlines the observations, means, standard deviations, and minimum and 
maximum values for the Prairies Provinces, Central Canada and British Columbia, and the 
Maritimes respectively.
4.4.1. DEPENDENT VARIABLE
The dependent variable will be TFR, which will indicate the level of demand for children.  TFR 
measures the total number of children that a woman will have in her lifetime given that she 
survives until her fiftieth birthday by summing the age-specific fertility rates (ASTFR) for a 
woman, usually aged 15 to 49 (Hinde, 2007, 100). 14  Figures 3, 4, and 5 show provincial TFR 
patterns from 1976 onwards, and these patterns were described in more detail province by 
province in the Background section of this paper.
A general downward trend from 1976 onwards is apparent in all the provinces.  There are, 
however, three interruptions to this downward trend.  Firstly, from around 1982 to 1984 in the 
Prairies and Central Canada and British Columbia there is a slight leveling off and reversal of 
fertility declines.  Two more prominent reversals in fertility decline are apparent from 1988 to 
1992 and from 2001 onwards.  In the Prairie Provinces and, especially, Central Canada and 
British Columbia, the spike in fertility rates from 1988 is very apparent.  This spike occurred 
more mutedly in the Maritime Provinces. From 2001 onwards, all provinces have exhibited a 
fertility rebound, but this rebound is most prominent in the Prairies and Central Canada and 
British Columbia, and to a lesser extent in the Maritimes.
14 TFR is not without drawbacks when used as a predictor for future population growth.  As Sobotka (2004, 213) 
demonstrates, the tempo-adjusted indicator of TFR (cohort total fertility rates) may be a more accurate measure of current 
fertility, as it takes into account delays in childbearing that many countries are undergoing .
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4.4.2. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Male Income and Unemployment
To measure the opportunity cost of child bearing and child rearing, I have assumed a traditional 
household gender role, as per New Home Economics assumptions.   In such a case, male total 
income, as measured by earnings, in addition to investments and government transfers, is an 
appropriate measure for family income.  In this study, male income is measured in 2006 
Canadian dollars.  Unemployment is provided as a general indicator of the economic outlook. 
During times of economic uncertainty, postponement becomes a huge factor in fertility 
decisions.  People are more inclined to invest in education to improve their job prospects and 
wait until the economy is more stable before childbearing.  The absolute correlation between 
male income and unemployment is very high (71 percent).  Dramatic declines in male income 
and increases in unemployment can be found around 1982 and 1990 across the country.  These 
trends are shaped by the same general conditions in the economy.  As such, I will examine the 
forces driving both of these factors together.  
Figures 7, 8, and 9 and 10, 11, and 12 respectively outline the trends in each of the provincial 
groupings for male income and unemployment in relation to TFR.  For the time period in 
question, male earnings and unemployment are turbulent, but experience some distinct spikes 
and troughs.  Around 1979 to 1980 there is an apparent spike in male income and decrease in 
unemployment, especially noticeable in the Prairie Provinces.  In 1979, the oil-shocks that 
wreaked havoc on so many Western economies had a lesser impact on the resource-heavy 
Canadian economy.  The economies of the oil-rich Prairie Provinces, in fact, were strengthened. 
As a result, the financial hubs of Canada in Central Canada and British Columbia also 
experienced a spike in male wages and trough in unemployment at this time.  The Maritimes, 
meanwhile, did not experience these extremes, with the exception of Newfoundland – another 
province with oil reserves.
Male income levels dropped and unemployment increased significantly in 1982, as persistent 
inflation and high interest rates pushed the country into a major recession (Human Resources and 
Skills Development Canada, 2006).  Although a slight recovery followed in 1983, male income 
and unemployment remained at these extreme levels from the mid to late 1980’s until the 
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mid-1990’s.  This can largely be attributed to large scale structural changes that occurred in 
Canada around this time.  Nineteen-eighty-seven saw the introduction of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) which introduced freer movement of American imports and 
companies.  Newer technologies, widespread deregulation, and the introduction of a national 
sales tax also impacted the economy tremendously at this time (Kwan, 2002, pp.1).  Kwan (2002, 
pp.6) found that the adaptation of new technologies required for Canadian firms to compete in 
this new environment implied that more money was spent on investments in new technologies 
and less on wages.  Workforce composition changes occurred throughout this period, as 
companies increasingly required more adaptable employees.  Further to these changes, any gains 
made in this period were stymied by the American recession of the early 1990’s which severely 
impacted Canada, and explains the extreme drop in male income and spike in unemployment 
around this time.
From the mid-1990’s, however, the Canadian economy was able to adapt to this restructuring 
process and recover.  Male income increases and unemployment decreases from the mid-1990’s 
until at least 2000 in both the Prairies and Central Canada and British Columbia.  The Prairie 
Provinces have seen steady economic growth from the late 1990’s, as oil prices have increased 
steadily.   Central Canada and British Columbia, on the other hand, whose financial sectors are 
closely tied to the United States, have seen some stagnation in economic growth from 2001 
onwards.  The Maritimes, meanwhile, did not see any economic rebound from the mid-1990’s 
onwards, and have continued to struggle due to the generally weaker performance of their main 
industries – fishing, shipbuilding, and logging – in the 1980’s and 1990’s.  Although 
unemployment rates have declined since the mid-1990’s relative to the other regions, Maritime 
unemployment has remained high.  Only Newfoundland, with recent discoveries of oil deposits 
in the 2000’s, has fared well.
Male income seems to be a fairly good predictor of TFR from 1976 to 2006 across Canada in 
terms of the general movement, but falls short of predicting some of the more obvious peaks and 
valleys in TFR trends.  When lagged, male income becomes increasingly correlated with TFR, 
exhibiting the highest correlation, 30.4 percent, when lagged four years.  Unemployment proves 
to be much more in tandem with TFR throughout the period.  Whereas the extreme dip then 
spike in TFR across the country in the late 1980’s is difficult to attribute to a change in male 
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income, it does very obviously follow an extreme rise and fall in unemployment levels.  In fact, 
applying a lag of one to two years across all the provinces, one can see a very apparent negative 
correlation between TFR and unemployment.  The highest absolute correlation is apparent with a 
two year lag, at 57.2 percent.  Furthermore, this correlation remains above 50 percent even after 
the anomalous 1989 spike in TFR.
Female Labour Market Earnings
Female income must be considered in a different light than male income.  Opportunity cost is 
best reflected by foregone earnings from participation in the labour force.  As such, female 
income should not include government transfers and investment gains, as the measure for male 
income does.  The female income variable is, therefore, female labour market earnings in 
constant 2006 dollars.  For female earnings, there is also an age consideration.  As child bearing 
is limited to women within a certain age group, it is preferable to limit analysis to the average 
female earnings of women within this age group.  The majority of births take place in the 20 to 
34 age range, and it would be ideal to focus analysis on female earnings within this age range. 
My data source, however, only provides this data for the 25 to 34 age range.  As such, female 
earnings for the 25 to 34 age range are used.
Figures 13, 14, and 15 outline the trends in female earnings and TFR from 1976 to 2006 for the 
three regions.  Female earnings steadily increase across the country, but as with other variables it 
is to varying degrees in each region.  In the Prairie Provinces, the first decade in question shows 
a type of rollercoaster pattern that generally moves upwards, but stagnates somewhat from the 
mid-1990’s to mid-1980’s.  This stagnation is likely tied to the economic structural changes 
occurring in this period, as discussed above.  Marked improvements in female earnings levels 
occur from the mid-1990’s onwards.  Although females in the Prairies started out in 1976 with 
wage levels that were on average $3,000 lower than those in Central Canada and British 
Columbia, by 2006, this difference was driven down to around $1,000.  The upward trend in 
female wages is far steeper and more consistent in Central Canada and British Columbia, with 
noticeable dips both in 1982 and 1991, when the aforementioned recessions took place in 
Canada.  A similar picture is painted in the Maritimes, but with the noteworthy distinction that 
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the absolute levels of income are much lower than in the other two regions, and the gains far 
more gradual.
Female income is a not a consistent predictor of TFR, if one does not take into consideration 
changes in the institutional context from the 1990’s onwards.  A general negative relationship is 
apparent in all provinces from 1976 until the 1990’s.  Around 2000, however, when the TFR 
reverses in all the Canadian provinces, the correlation with female earnings becomes positive. 
The reversal in correlation is due entirely to the spike in TFR after 2000.  The previous spike in 
TFR experienced across the country around 1989 cannot be explained by any extreme changes in 
female earnings.  One thing that is apparent is that the correlation between TFR and female 
earnings prior to 1989, 25.6 percent, is much greater than the correlation between these two 
variables following 1989, 6.3 percent. Indeed, the 1990’s present an interesting departure from 
the rest of the years in question with regards to this relationship, as post-2000 observations 
appear to exhibit a much higher correlation between TFR and female earnings.
Female Labour Force Participation
Female labour force participation is an imperfect proxy for the position of women in a society, 
and the relative importance of women’s career aspirations.  In this case, the variable captures the 
rate of women both employed and unemployed who participate in the labour force as a rate of 
the total female population in that age range.  I have taken the rate for women aged 25 to 44, as 
this was the age range available that best captured the labour force activity of women of child 
bearing age.
Figures 16, 17, and 18 outline the trends in female labour force participation rates and TFR from 
1976 to 2006 for the three regions.  Across all provinces, there is a consistent upward trend in 
this variable, with a slight leveling at or above 75 percent participation rates in all the provinces. 
Central Canada and British Columbia remain extremely consistent with the national average 
throughout the entire period while the Prairie Provinces surpass it around 1980 until converging 
again around 2000.  The Maritimes have remained consistently lower than the national average 
until convergence around 2000. 
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Given the steady upward trend of this variable, and the turbulence of TFR over the same time 
period, it is difficult to attribute many of the spikes and valleys in TFR levels to female labour 
force participation alone.  The overall correlation between the two variables is 27 percent. 
However, when I divide the period into pre and post-1990, the correlations become much larger, 
respectively 38 and 46 percent.   It does appear that the leveling off of female labour force 
participation growth rates from 1990 onwards do correspond with the spike in TFR around 1989, 
but this leveling off appears to start after the large increase in TFR.
Job-Protected Leave
My variable to measure policies alleviating indirect child bearing and child rearing costs is 
unpaid job-protected parental leave.  It is calculated by summing the maternity leave and 
parental leave, to the maximum allowable leave length for a parent.  Job-protected parental leave 
is an imperfect proxy for indirect cost-reducing polices, and there are some assumptions 
underlying its use.  Firstly, it is assumed that the mother takes the entire amount of time for the 
parental leave.  In most provinces, both parents can take the parental leave period, with the 
stipulation that if a mother has taken the full maternity leave, her parental leave is limited to 35 
weeks.  However, in some provinces, such as Alberta, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward 
Island, the parental leave portion must be shared between both parents.  In these cases, it is 
assumed that the mother took the entire leave.   
Second, it is recognized that unpaid job-protected leave is only one component of parental leave 
policy.  The benefits component, however, is controlled at the federal level, and only topped up 
by one province, Quebec.  As such, provincial variation only comes into play in the leave length 
component of the policy.  Further, parental leave benefits are viewed as a component of direct 
cost-reducing family policy, the analysis of which is not the aim of this paper.  For this reason, 
the full unpaid length that is available to parents is used.
Figures 19, 20, and 21 outline the trends in job-protected leave and TFR from 1976 to 2006 for 
the three regions.  Changes in unpaid job-protected leave occur in one direction only, but up until 
the major legislative changes of 2001, discussed in the Background section, they occurred at 
different times and to different degrees across the country.  As discussed earlier, there were three 
changes to federal legislation from 1976 to 2006, and they occurred in 1984, 1999, and 2001 
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(Campbell, 2006, pp.181).  However, not all provinces fell in line with this legislation 
immediately.  Alberta provides a good example of this.  All three Prairie Provinces demonstrate 
a fairly uniform pattern, starting at around 18 weeks of leave until the early 1990’s for 
Saskatchewan and Manitoba.  In 1993 and 1995 respectively, Manitoba and Saskatchewan 
increased their leave length to 30 and 34 weeks.  Alberta, however, did not follow suit until the 
federal legislative changes of 2001, after which all three provinces increased to a minimum of 52 
weeks.
Ontario, Quebec, and British Columbia exhibit two distinct patterns.  Firstly, British Columbia 
and Ontario share a similar trend, starting at 18 and 17 weeks of leave respectively.  Ontario 
increased its leave to 35 weeks in 1992, and, along with British Columbia, again in 2001 to the 
mandatory 52 weeks.  Quebec exhibits a completely different pattern than all the other provinces, 
having adopted its own unique family allowance plan in 1967.   It starts the period in question 
with the shortest parental leave length, zero weeks, but had caught up to the rest of Canada in 
1979, with the adoption of maternity leave benefits.  In 1991, Quebec surpassed the rest of 
Canada in terms of parental leave length, extending the leave to 52 weeks in the context of a 
drastic expansion of its family policy benefits.  In 1997, Quebec switched to a more holistic 
approach to family policy, transferring funding to indirect cost-reducing policies in the form of 
child care accessibility and parental leave benefit enhancements.  As of 1997, 70 weeks of 
parental leave are available to Quebec parents, and the compensated weeks are far higher than in 
the rest of Canada.
Finally, the Maritime Provinces’ parental leave patterns from 1976 to 2006 are relatively 
consistent with each other.  Prince Edward Island started the period at the lowest level, only 
adopting parental leave in 1981.  By this point, all four provinces had a leave level of 17 weeks, 
which was extended between 1991 and 1994 by each of the provinces.  New Brunswick extended 
the leave to the greatest extent, reaching 35 weeks, while Newfoundland extended the leave to 30 
weeks.  Following the 2001 legislative changes, all four provinces extended their leave length to 
52 weeks.
Job-protected leave does not vary directly with TFR.  Like female earnings, it moves consistently 
upwards, initially exhibiting a negative relationship with TFR until a reversal around 2001. 
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However, it does seem closely tied to the major spikes in TFR that occur around 1989 and 2000. 
These sharp rises in TFR across the country occur in most provinces around the time that 
parental leave lengths were increased.  However, in certain instances, such as the early 1990’s, 
increases in leave length were immediately preceded by a spike in TFR.  It is also important to 
note that until 1988, there is a consistently positive correlation between unpaid job-protected 
parental leave and TFR.  In the 1990’s, however, this correlation becomes quite large and 
negative, until reversing and becoming small and positive in 1998.  These patterns do bring to 
light the question of whether these policies are simply supplementary to TFR changes or even 
perhaps caused by them.
Relative Cohort Size
As discussed in the theory section, relative cohort size is used as a proxy for relative income.  It 
is calculated by dividing the population aged 30 to 64 by the population aged 15 to 29.  As the 
younger cohort increases relative to its preceding cohort (thus decreasing the relative cohort size) 
a crowding out effect is thought to take place, and fertility is supposed to decline.  Relative 
cohort size exhibits a very consistent trend across the country over the time period in question. 
In all provinces, there is a steady ratio until around 1985, when there is a much more dramatic 
increase in RCS.  This increase coincides with the post-World War II baby boom generation 
reaching the ages of 30 to 64, and explains the sudden increase in all the provinces.
Figures 22, 23, and 24 outline the trends in relative cohort size and TFR from 1976 to 2006.  In 
the Prairie Provinces, the slow initial increase in the late 1970’s and the leveling off that occur in 
the mid-1990’s are much more pronounced than the national average.  Additionally, the increase 
from the mid-1980’s is less steep.  The heavy resource base of the industries in these provinces 
may help explain this trend, as younger migrants from across the country are drawn to these 
economies for work.  There are, consequently, higher populations in the 15 to 29 age range. 
While Central Canada and British Columbia follow the national average very closely, the 
Maritimes exhibit a similar pattern, but with slightly steeper inclines than the national average. 
Part of the explanation for this different pattern is that the Maritime Provinces are the source of 
many of the young migrants to the resource-heavy Prairie Provinces. 
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Across the country, the relationship between RCS and TFR seems inconsistent over this time 
period.  The correlation between RCS and TFR starts out as negative and remains so until the 
mid-1980s.  At this point, in all three regions, it becomes positive as the TFR spikes around 
1989.  Following this, there is an obvious negative correlation across all the regions.
4.4.3. CONCLUDING REMARKS
From the bivariate analysis, there were a number of findings that came to light.  The smaller and 
more delayed impact of male income on TFR and the decreased correlation between female 
earnings and TFR in the 1990’s seem to point to the importance of another key factor in 
explaining TFR trends throughout this period.   Job-protected parental leave does not appear to 
be a likely candidate for this, as the correlation during the 1990’s becomes negative for most of 
the decade.   The unemployment rate, however, is a prime candidate for this missing link, as its 
correlation with TFR remains above 50 percent even after the irregular spike in TFR in 1989.  It 
would appear, therefore, that although income and opportunity cost are important determinants 
of TFR, general economic outlook has a more immediate and pronounced impact on fertility 
rates at the aggregate level.  It remains to be seen what the multivariate analysis will show with 
regards to each of these variables.
5. RESULTS
5.1 STATISTICAL RESULTS
The statistical results of my multivariate models are outlined in Table 10.  Further to the 
coefficient and hypothesis test outputs, I have calculated the percentage change that a one unit 
increase in each independent variable will have on TFR.  This was calculated using the following 
formula:  100*(exp(b)-1).  These values are also included in Table 10.
5.2. DISCUSSION
5.2.1. COMPARISON OF THE MODELS’ RESULTS
Looking at the pooled OLS results, the majority of the variables appear to be significant and with 
signs that are feasible according to the theoretical considerations.  The notable exceptions to this 
are male income and female labour force participation, whose signs are the opposite of what 
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would be expected according to the outlined theory.15  Female earnings are shown to be 
insignificant in the pooled OLS regression.  The R-squared value for this model implies that 
these variables account for 81 percent of the variation in TFR.  However, this number should be 
interpreted with caution, as R-squared values are typically inflated in time series regressions.
Meanwhile, once I control for inter-provincial differences and temporal variations in the 
independent variables with the fixed effects model, the results look quite different.  The signs in 
the fixed effects model regressions are the same as the pooled OLS results, except for the female 
labour force participation, female earnings, and relative cohort size variables.  Additionally, the 
number of independent variable coefficients that are significant is much smaller. Only female 
earnings are significant at the five percent level, while unpaid job-protected parental leave is 
significant at the ten percent level and female labour force participation almost significant at the 
ten percent level.  The remaining coefficients are highly insignificant.  
The R-squared values for the fixed effects model indicate that within each province, the variables 
I have chosen account for 72 percent of the TFR variation; however, when the TFR differentials 
between provinces are taken into account, these variables only account for around 11 percent of 
the variation.  These differences in the R-squared values may indicate that there are important 
interprovincial differences that are not being accounted for by these variables.  For instance, 
differences in culture and political ideology are key factors in explaining inter-provincial 
differences in TFR and have not been captured in this model.
Another important consideration in comparing the two models is outlining what significance in 
one of these models, but not the other, might mean.  Generally speaking, if there are significant 
coefficients in the pooled OLS results that are insignificant in the fixed effects results, this could 
be an indication that changes in a given variable are not important in explaining changes in 
fertility within provinces over time.   However, these variables are likely important explanatory 
factors behind TFR differences between provinces. On the other hand, significance in the fixed 
effects regression results but not the OLS regression results implies that changes in a given 
variable affecting fertility may be related to changing conditions within a province.  This 
distinction will be useful in a more detailed discussion of the variable results below.
15 While it was considered that multicollinearity was the cause of these unusual signs, dropping highly correlated 
variables did not change the signs of either of these variables.
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5.2.2. Variable Results Discussion
Some of these results are highly unexpected, both with respect to my bivariate analysis and with 
respect to theory and previous literature.  The insignificance of unemployment in the fixed 
effects model is especially counterintuitive.  Although its impact on TFR was both significant 
and relatively substantial in the pooled OLS model, this was not the case when interprovincial 
variations and temporal changes were controlled for.  Previous research has been nearly 
unanimous regarding the negative correlation between unemployment and fertility, and this 
correlation was apparent in the bivariate analysis. Male income exhibits the same significance in 
the OLS regression, but not the fixed effects regression.  The negative relationship of male 
income and TFR is also unexpected according to theory, previous findings, and bivariate analysis 
with this data.  Though initially thought to be due to multicollinearity, this does not appear to be 
the case, as the sign remains negative even when highly correlated independent variables are 
removed.  As noted, significance in the OLS model but not the fixed effects model might be an 
indication that unemployment and male income are more important factors in explaining TFR 
differences between provinces, as opposed to within them.
The female earnings variable is inconsistent in terms of sign and significance.  The 
insignificance of female earnings can possibly be traced to multicollinearity. When male income, 
which has a 78 percent correlation with female earnings, is omitted from the regression, female 
earnings are significant.  The f_earnings variable remains consistent in terms of the very small 
size of the impact.  The bivariate analysis may be able to shed some light on these 
inconsistencies.  Based on Figures 13, 14, and 15, the relationship between female earnings and 
TFR does not appear to be consistent in terms of magnitude or size over the time period.  It is 
also possible that since this variable is significant in the fixed effects results but not the pooled 
OLS results, it may be a more important factor in explaining within-province differences in TFR. 
Meanwhile, female labour force participation, though initially significant and positive in the OLS 
regression, becomes insignificant and negative in the fixed effects regression.  In this case, it 
may indicate the larger impact of female labour force participation on TFR differences between 
provinces.  Further, the percent impact on TFR is halved in the fixed effects model.  Again, this 
inconsistency is reflective of the inconsistent relationship between these variables that was 
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apparent in my bivariate analysis.  Previous research has been mixed with regards to the macro-
level relationships between female earnings and female labour force participation and TFR over 
this time period.  As noted in the introduction, the relationship between these variables and TFR 
has reversed at the macro level in a number of countries since the 1990’s (Kohler, 2006, pp.15).
Relative cohort size appears to be a good proxy for tastes in the initial pooled OLS regression, as 
it appears that a one unit increase in the proportion of 15 to 29 year olds to 30 to 64 year olds 
(i.e. the more the relative cohort crowding and the less able a cohort is to reach its aspirations), 
brings about a 25 percent decrease in TFR.  This impact is significant in the pooled OLS 
regression.  However, it becomes highly insignificant when inter-provincial trends are controlled 
for, indicating that it possibly explains between-province differences in TFR but not within-
province differences.  It also becomes positive in the fixed effects results, which is counter to 
theoretical predictions and previous research findings.  This inconsistency is not surprising in the 
context of previous findings for Canada which found that since the 1970’s, RCS has not been a 
relevant predictor of fertility.
The variable of most interest in this analysis is unpaid job-protected leave.  Both the OLS and 
fixed effects regressions have found that its impact on fertility is small, positive and significant 
(at the five percent level for OLS and the ten percent level for fixed effects).  This could indicate 
that bother between and within-province differences in TFR are explained by this variable over 
time.  Respectively, the OLS and fixed effects models indicate that a one week increase in 
unpaid job-protected parental leave will result in a 0.13 and 0.14 percent increase in TFR.  In 
light of the consistency between the two models, it is plausible to conclude that there is a positive 
association between this variable and fertility.  This finding is supported by relevant theory. 
Although there is no comparable research at the macro level, these findings do fall in line with 
micro studies that have controlled for the presence of maternity leave and the implementation of 
more generous parental leave policies outside of Canada.16  However, as noted in the bivariate 
analysis, this coefficient should be interpreted with caution, especially with regards to causality. 
The inconsistent bivariate findings that could just as easily support a reversed causal relationship 
between TFR and unpaid job-protected leave cast some doubt on these findings.
16 These studies include Averett (2001) in the United States and Lalive (2005) in Austria.
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5.2.3. LIMITATIONS
A key component to understanding why my theory-based hypotheses may not be reflected in my 
empirical results lies in a discussion of the limitations of this study.  Omitted variables are likely 
a prime candidate for many of the irregularities found in my results.  As noted, inter-provincial 
differences in religion, language, and political ideologies are not controlled for in my model. 
Additional weaknesses can be found in the choice of proxies for many of the theoretical factors 
influencing fertility discussed above.  The proxy choices were often limited by data availability 
constraints.  The shortcomings of these proxy choices and the model specification are discussed 
below.
Data Limitations
As outlined in the hypothesis section, people who are most impacted by parental leave policies 
exhibit specific demographic and socioeconomic characteristics.  The ability to narrow down the 
dependent and independent variables and hone in on these groups would improve my analysis. 
For instance, with regard to demographic factors, an important consideration is age.  Although 
the ASTFR data is not available provincially prior to 1990, analyzing the relation of annual TFR 
to ASTFR from this point brings to light some important considerations.  From 1990 onwards, 
the proportion of births in the 20-34 age range accounts for a minimum of 75 percent of all births 
in a given year, and in most cases around 80 percent.  When considering the target population of 
a family policy, this is an important observation.  Data availability did not enable me to narrow 
my dependent variable down to this particular age-group.
In terms of socioeconomic factors, it is important to consider that parental leave policies and, 
family policies in general, are often aimed at parents in stable employment.  As indicated earlier, 
maternity benefit qualification has also typically been concentrated among women of at least 
high school education.  As such, the ideal approach would have been to narrow down the 
dependent variable to this socioeconomic group.  In the absence of this ability, income, earnings, 
and labour force participation variables imperfectly controlled for socioeconomic factors.
The use of maximum unpaid parental leave length as a proxy for indirect cost-reducing policies 
has a number of limitations.  It was recognized previously, that the number of weeks of unpaid 
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leave for which a mother is eligible does not capture the entire context of parental leave policies 
in each province.  For instance, although Alberta’s and Nova Scotia’s leave policy lengths now 
match those of most other provinces, qualification for these leaves is 12 months of continuous 
employment – much more stringent conditions than in any other province.
There are, however, some more serious limitations to the use of parental leave length.  As 
indicated in the background section, institutional context should ideally be captured holistically, 
taking into account not only direct and indirect cost-reducing family policy measures, but also 
the social policy context in general.  Capturing this context in a statistical analysis with a few key 
variables is extremely unlikely, if not impossible.
Model Specification Limitations
As mentioned in the Methods section of this paper, there were shortcomings with respect to 
model specification.  One such shortcoming was assuming away endogeneity.  McNown (2003, 
pp.345) provides a comprehensive discussion of the consequences of ignoring endogeneity in the 
context of fertility studies.  Endogeneity consequences include the potential for inconsistent least 
squares estimators of model parameters.   Though assuming away this issue is undoubtedly 
flawed, a number of studies that have ignored this issue have also been important contributions 
to the body of work surrounding determinants of fertility.  Butz and Ward (1979), for instance, 
questionably treat female wages as exogenous in their analysis (McNown, 2003, pp.346).
Ignoring non-stationarity is a further limitation of this study.  McNown (2003, pp.244) outlines 
the potential for spurious inferences about relationships between variables if non-stationarity is 
ignored.  Possible solutions, such as first differencing are mentioned as having been used in 
various papers on fertility, including Gauthier (1997).  However, in the case of my data, the use 
of first differences did not solve the non-stationarity problem.  Once again, however, it is noted 
by McNown (2003, pp.246) that a number of contributory papers have ignored this issue.  This is 
a concern that I would address with future research.
A further limitation to the model specification involves multicollinearity.  It was noted that male 
income and unemployment and male income and female earnings were highly correlated with 
each other.  In some instances, the removal of a highly correlated variable did impact the sign 
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and significance of some of the coefficients.  However, it was decided that following the 
theoretical model was key to this analysis, perhaps to the detriment of reliable statistical outputs.
6. CONCLUSION
The research question posed in this study was straightforward.  Its aim was to ascertain whether 
unpaid job-protected leave, acting as a proxy for the indirect cost-reducing family policy 
environment, impacted aggregate fertility trends across Canada.  The statistical outputs for the 
econometric model adopted to answer this question superficially provide a straightforward and 
consistent affirmative response.  Closer inspection of the data, model, and results, however, 
reveals a less definitive answer to the research question.  Omitted variables, endogeneity issues, 
non-stationarity in the data, and the use of imperfect proxies were factors that cast doubt on the 
outcomes of this statistical analysis.  The inconsistency of the multivariate econometric findings 
with simple bivariate analyses of the variables was an important indicator that further work 
should be done to correct for the aforementioned problems in future research.  Moreover, 
shortcomings in the institutional proxy suggest that future research should also extend to analysis 
of other indirect cost-reducing policy factors, such as child care accessibility.  Though a causal 
linkage between unpaid job-protected parental leave and TFR cannot be confirmed, this study 
provides a starting point for the as yet unexplored territory of the impact of indirect cost-
reducing family policies on fertility across Canada.
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TABLES
Table 1: Provincial GDP per Capita, 2007
Province
2007 
GDP/Capita 
(2002 Dollars)
British Columbia 37,258
Alberta 54,540
Saskatchewan 39,624
Manitoba 35,093
Ontario 41,616
Quebec 34,555
New Brunswick 30,960
Nova Scotia 31,089
Prince Edward Island 29,785
Newfoundland 38,193
Source: Adapted from Statistics Canada, 2001
Table 2: Family Benefits of the Provinces, 2009 (dollars)
Province
Maximum Amount
1st Child 2nd Child
3rd 
Child
4th and 
subsequent child
Income ceiling 
at which 
reduction 
applies
Reduction 
Rate
Newfoundland 
and Labrador
257 335 360 386
Supplement for children under 1 year: 540 
Bonus at birth: 90
17397
5.1%, 6.7%, 
7.2% or 
7.72%
Prince Edward 
Island n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
Nova Scotia 445 645 720 720 16000
9.04%, 
22.15%, 
36.78% or 
51.4%
New Brunswick 250 250 250 250 20000 2.5% or 5%
Quebec 2166 1083 1083 1623 32696 (single) 44599 (couple) 4%
Ontario 804 804 804 804 20000 8%
Alberta 694 631 379 127 33873 4%
Manitoba 360 360 360 360
Depending on 
the number of 
children
$12 for 
every $48
Saskatchewan n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
British Columbia 1332 1332 1332 1332 20500 9% and 18%
Source: Finances Quebec, 2009, pp.9
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Table 3: Job-Protected Parental Leave across Canada, 2006
Jurisdiction Maternity Leave
Parental 
Leave
Maximum Job-
Protected Leave 
(Maternity and 
Parental)
Continuous 
Employment 
Requirements
Both Parents 
Able to Take 
Full Leave
Federal 17 37 52 6 months No
British Columbia 17 37 52 None Yes
Alberta 15 37 52 12 months No
Saskatchewan 18 37 52
20 weeks in past 
year Yes
Manitoba 17 37 54 7 months Yes
Ontario 17 37 52 13 weeks Yes
Quebec 18 52 70 None Yes
New Brunswick 17 37 52 None No
Nova Scotia 17 52 52 12 months Yes
Prince Edward Island 17 35 52 20 weeks No
Newfoundland 17 35 52 20 weeks Yes
Source: Statistics Canada, 2007
Table 4: Child Care Overview across Canada, 2006
Province
% Coverage with 
Regulated Child 
Care Spaces
% 
Regulated 
that are 
Not-for-
Profit
Median or Mean 
Monthly Parent Fees 
for Full-Time Care, 
Preschoolers (3-5)
British Columbia 13.51 58* 550
Alberta 12.14 51 573
Saskatchewan 5.40 100 420
Manitoba 13.33 94 376**
Ontario 11.92 77 541
Quebec 34.54 87 150
New Brunswick 13.26 36 467
Nova Scotia 10.42 54 716
Prince Edward Island 20.21 44 428
Newfoundland 8.57 31 455
*Information not available for 2006.  2001 value used instead
**Information not available for 2006.  2004 value used instead
Source: Early Childhood Education Centre, various years
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Table 5: Summary of Literature Reviewed
Country Author/ year Data Methods of analysis
Dependent 
variable Policy variable
Parental Leave Policies
United 
States Averett 2001
National 
Longitudinal 
Study of Youth, 
1985 to 1992
Logistic 
regression
Probability of 
a birth
Presence of  paid or 
unpaid maternity leave
Sweden Duvander, 2005
Micro-data from 
Swedish 
population 
register from 
1988-99
Event-history 
analysis
Second and 
third births
Father’s and mother’s 
uptake of parental-leave 
benefits
Austria Hoem, 2001
Austrian Family 
and Fertiity 
Survey 
1995-1996
Hazard 
regression
Probability of 
third birth Parental leave policy
Austria Lalive, 2005
Austrian Social 
Security Dataset, 
1990
Regression 
discontinuty 
analysis
Probability of 
having a child 
within the 3-
year period 
following 
changes in 
policy
Parental leave policy
Canada Phipps, 2000
Micro-data from 
1988/89/90 
Labour Market 
Activities Survey
Probit model
Probability a 
woman will 
have a baby
Availability of maternity 
leave benefits
Finland and 
Norway Ronsen, 1999
1998 Norwegian 
Family and 
Occupation 
Survey and 1998 
Finnish 
Population 
Survey
Hazard-rate 
analysis
Probability of 
birth Parental leave policy
OECD 
countries
Winegarden, 
1995
Macro data, 17 
OECD countries 
in 1959, 1969, 
1979, and 1989
Fixed-
individual 
effects method
General 
fertility rate, 
infant 
mortality rate, 
and female 
labour force 
participation 
rate
Maternity leave benefits
Child Care Policies
Sweden Andersson, 2004
Register data 
1997-1998
Event-history 
analysis
Probability of 
a second and 
third birth
Regional childcare 
characteristics
Switzerland Bonoli, 2008 Macro data, 26 cantons
Multivariable 
OLS
TFR average 3 
years
Day care centers per 
capita, level of family 
benefits
OECD 
countries Castles, 2003
Aggregate data 
from 1960's to 
1990's
Cross country 
regressions
Period total 
fertility rates
Proportion of children 
using child-care, flexible 
work arrangements, 
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Country Author/ year Data Methods of analysis
Dependent 
variable Policy variable
social policy expenditure
Italy Del Boca, 2007
Italian datasets, 
the SHIW and 
the Multiscopo 
survey
Bivariate 
probit model
Female labour 
force 
participation, 
use of child 
care
Child care cost
Nordic 
countries Gupta, 2006
Macro data 
trends in Nordic 
countries
Literature 
review and 
analysis
Impact on 
labour supply, 
gender equity, 
fertility, child 
welfare, and 
financial costs
Child care and parental 
leave
Germany Hank, 2003
German Socio-
Economic Panel 
(GSOEP) micro-
data from 1984 
to 1995  linked 
with official 
statistics on the 
regional day-care 
provision
Multilevel 
discrete-time 
logit models
Transition to 
first child
Availability of public 
day care and informal 
private day care 
arrangements (i.e., social 
networks)
Norway Kravdal, 1996
Family and 
Occupation 
Survey 1988
Logistic 
regression
Probability of 
a first second 
and third birth
Provision of day-care 
facilities
Cash Transfers/Tax Incentive Policies
Germany, 
Italy, Spain Apps, 2004 Aggregate data
Application of 
a household 
consumption 
model
Total fertility 
rate
Child care availability, 
child payments, taxation
OECD 
countries d'Addio, 2005 Aggegate data
Pooled OLS 
estimator, 
generalized 
method of 
moments, and 
Pooled Mean 
Group 
estimator
Logged TFR
Differential tax rates, 
parental leave length and 
benefits, public spending 
on leave benefits
Canada Duclos, 2001
Series of yearly 
repeated cross-
sectional data 
sets in Quebec
Linear 
probability 
model, parity 
specific 
regressions
Probability of 
transitioning 
from one 
parity to 
another
Newborn universal 
allowances, tax credits 
for dependent children, 
and family income tax 
reductions
France Ekert, 1986 Aggregate data from 1970's
Multivariate 
OLS Logged TFR Family benefits
France Ekert, 2002
French 
Permanent 
Demographic 
Sample (EDP), 
longitudinal 
panel data
Logistic 
regression
Parity 
progression 
ratios and 
annual 
probabilities of 
giving birth
Gender equity policy
OECD 
countries Gauthier. 1997
Aggregate data 
from 1970-1990
Fixed-effects 
estimator Logged TFR
Ratio of family payments 
to average weekly 
earnings, maternity leave 
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Country Author/ year Data Methods of analysis
Dependent 
variable Policy variable
time and payment
Sweden Hoem, 1993 Official statistics from 1961-1990
Indirect 
standardization
Parity-specific 
birth rate Parental leave benefits
Canada Hyatt, 1991 Macro data from 1948-1986
Multivariable 
OLS Logged TFR
Maternity leave benefits, 
ongoing family payments
Canada Milligan, 2001
Micro data, 1991 
and 1996 PUMF-
F report 
information on a 
sample of 
345,351 and 
342,231 families
Multinomial 
logit
Whether a 
woman had a 
child
Availability of the 
Quebec baby bonus
Japan Yasuoko, 2009
Aggregate data 
from Asia and 
Western Europe
Application of 
a growth 
model
Total fertility 
rate
Child allowance, 
reduction in care time for 
children, and education 
subsidies
Canada Zhang, 1994
Aggregate data 
from 1921 to 
1983
Ordinary least 
squares
Total fertility 
rate
Tax exemption, tax 
credit , family allowance, 
maternity leave benefits
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Table 6: Results of Studies Included in the Literature Review
Author Country Year
Impact on fertility
Child 
care
Parental 
leave
Financial 
benefits
Labour 
supply effect
Parental Leave Policies
Averett United States 2001 ++
Duvander Sweden 2005   +   
Hoem Austria 2001  n.s.   
Lalive Austria 2005  ++   ++
Ronsen Finland, Norway 1999   +   
Winegarden OECD countries 1995 + ++
Child Care Policies
Andersson Sweden 2004  n.s.    
Bonoli Switzerland 2008  ++   ++  
Castles OECD countries 2003  ++    
Del Boca Italy 2002  ++    
Del Boca Italy 2007     ++
Gupta Nordic countries 2006  +  +   
Hank W. Germany 2003 n.s.    
Kravdal Norway 1996  +    
Benefits/Cash Transfers/Tax Incentive Policies
Apps OECD countries 2004  +   +  +
D'Addio OECD countries 2005 ++  ++  ++  +
Duclos Canada 2001    ++  
Ekert France 1986   + +  
Ekert 
France and 
Britain 2002    +  
Gauthier OECD countries 1997  + n.s.  +  
Hoem Sweden 1993    +  
Hyatt Canada 1991    +  
Milligan Canada 2001    ++  
Yasuoko Japan 2008  +   +  
Phipps Canada 2000  n.s.  n.s.
Zhang Canada 1994    ++  
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Table 7: Predicted Relationships of Variables with TFR
Variable
Predicted 
Relationship 
with TFR
Male income + *
Female earnings - *
Female labour force participation - *
Unemployment - *
Parental leave length uncertain
Relative cohort size +
*This impact may be offset depending on the institutional environment
Table 8: Variable Data Sources and Sample Sizes
Dependent variable Source Sample Size
Total fertility rate
1974-1994: Ford (1996)
1995-1999: Statistics Canada Cat.  No. 
84F0210XPB
2000-2006: CANSIM table 102-4505
30 years, 9 provinces
16 years, 1 province
Independent variables
Demand Factors Source Sample Size
Average total male income 1976-2006: CANSIM Table 202-0407 30 years, 10 provinces
Average total female 
income 1976-2006: CANSIM Table 202-0407
30 years, 10 provinces
Female labour force 
participation rate 1976-2006: CANSIM Table 202-0407
30 years, 10 provinces
Parental leave length 1976-2000: Cate (2003)2000-2006: HRSDC (2006)
30 years, 10 provinces
Relative cohort size 1976-2006: CANSIM Table 102-0507 30 years, 10 provinces
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Table 9: Summary Statistics by Region
Prairies
Variable Observations Mean St. Dev Min Max
ltfr 93 0.6336 0.05606 0.4947 0.81093
lagleave 90 25.8111 13.1874 17 54
lagunemp 90 6.62556 1.81663 3.8 11.3
lagmincome 90 38957.8 4260.19 33100 49900
lagf_earnings 90 23175.6 2077.18 18800 31900
lagflfp 90 74.8933 8.78953 51.1 84
lagRCS 90 1.71522 0.35548 1.11 2.19
Central Canada and BC
Variable Observations Mean St. Dev Min Max
ltfr 93 0.4446 0.0619 0.31481 0.53649
lagleave 90 30.9667 19.1343 0 70
lagunemp 90 9.20444 2.31269 5 15
lagmincome 90 40751.1 3514.41 34200 49300
lagf_earnings 90 25793.3 2002.18 22600 33300
lagflfp 90 73.0678 8.3789 48.4 83
lagRCS 90 1.94567 0.42062 1.28 2.54
Maritimes
Variable Observations Mean St. Dev Min Max
ltfr 109 0.4456 0.12669 0.19062 0.75142
lagleave 120 25.217 14.6993 0 52
lagunemp 120 13.298 2.94714 8.4 20.2
lagmincome 120 31990.9 2315.13 27600 37500
lagf_earnings 120 20251.7 1715.28 16300 24700
lagflfp 120 68.9083 11.6437 37.5 88
lagRCS 120 1.7845 0.47386 1.06 2.64
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Table 10: Impact of Independent Variables on TFR, OLS and Fixed Effects Models
OLS1 Fixed Effects1
Variable Coefficient % change p-value2 Coefficient % change p-value2
lag_leave 0.0013094*** 0.131025764 0.001 0.0013923* 0.13932697 0.079
lag_unemp -0.0238689*** -2.35862908 0.000 -0.0021572 -0.2154875 0.633
lag_m_income -8.83E-06*** -0.000882996 0.000 -1.65E-06 -0.000165 0.648
lag_f_earnings -1.98E-06 -0.000198 0.325 3.65E-06** 0.000365 0.031
lag_flfp 0.0096509*** 0.969762011 0.000 -0.0047656 -0.4754263 0.113
lag_RCS -0.2909189*** -25.2423696 0.000 0.0451972 4.62341569 0.614
Constant 0.8393281 n/a 0.000 0.7901597 n/a 0.028
F-statistic 0.000 0.000
No. Observations 286 286
R-Squared within n/a 0.7226
between n/a 0.1056
overall 0.812 0.0867
1Year dummies are included in each regression
2Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity
*** Coefficient is significant at the 1 percent level
**Coefficient is significant at the 5 percent level
*Coefficient is significant at the 10 percent level
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